On Cuba, I Told You So

On Cuba, I Told You So
General Castro Rains on Obama's Foreign Policy Parade
JOSÉ AZEL MARCH 5, 2015 AT 12:18 PM

Español"I told you so" is a childish, inelegant expression unbecoming
any thoughtful essayist. Forgive me, but that is what my heart screamed
when reading General Castro's demands for normalizing relations with the
United States.

The general has upped the ante setting preconditions that the United
States must: return the US base at Guantanamo Bay, lift all economic
sanctions, and compensate his country for damages, in excess of US$116
billion taxpayer dollars. All this before the two nations can
reestablish normal relations. In his view, "if these problems aren't
resolved, this diplomatic rapprochement wouldn't make any sense."+

Last year, I wrote an article which I sought to make the point that
those advocating for a unilateral, unconditional change in US-Cuba
policy had failed to ask how Cuba would respond to such an overture. We
now have the answer to that question.

I also anticipated in that article that Castro would demand
compensation. Not a particularly dazzling exercise in clairvoyance since
Cuba has presented its demands for reparations yearly to the United
Nations for decades.

I noted then that not probing how Castro would respond was a curious
omission since the formulation of US foreign policy is often compared to
a chess game in which every prospective move is analyzed and weighted
with an eye to what the adversary's counter move would be. I argued that
it was irresponsible to advocate for a policy change without offering,
at least a theory of, what the other party would do. A foreign policy
move seeks reciprocity.

Nonetheless, advocates of an unconditional change in US-Cuba policy
succeeded in their quest, as evidenced by President Barack Obama's
December 17 announcement to seek normalization, and his State of the
Union message urging Congress to unilaterally eliminate all economic
sanctions. With that success, however, comes the duty of accepting
responsibility for the outcomes of their advocacy and recommendations.

The often repeated rationale was that the sanctions policy had failed
and a new approach was needed, but no thought was given as to what Cuba
would do. Refusing to anticipate Cuba's countermove, those responsible
for this policy disaster shifted the debate. They argued instead that
unilaterally ending economic sanctions would work to strengthen Cuba's
self-employed sector and, thus, foster a civil society more independent
of the government. Eventually this more autonomous civil society would
function as agents of change for democratic governance.

That argument is plausible, but flawed. In a totalitarian system, even
those working in self-employed activities are beholden to the government
for the very existence of their businesses in myriad bureaucratic ways.
Self-employment success in a totalitarian setting does not confer
independence from the government.

On the contrary, it makes the newly minted entrepreneurs more beholden
to the government for continued operating permits and the like. Thus,
success does not breed independence from the government but more
dependence, as few are willing to risk their livelihood antagonizing
their all-powerful patrons.

During the student protest in Tiananmen Square, China's business
community did not come out in support of the students. More recently we
witnessed a similar situation in Hong Kong. Sadly, these business
communities were not willing to jeopardize their positions and support
the students promoting democratic change. Why would we think that a
Cuban business community bound to an all powerful state for their very
existence would act differently?

So what should happen now that Castro has summarily dismissed Obama's
overtures by setting onerous preconditions? If we are truly interested
in promoting democracy in Cuba, the White House, the New York Times
editorial board, and all those that have advocated unconditional
concessions to the Castro regime, should acknowledge that they have
misread the nature of the regime. Noblesse oblige; whoever claims to be
noble must act nobly.

Most likely the spin machine will work overtime to develop all kinds of
doctrinaire arguments, bordering on sophistry, as to why we should stay
the new course, such as: General Castro is just laying out a starting
negotiating position, or, we tried economic sanctions for half a
century, should we not give this policy some time?

We may even begin to see arguments suggesting that Cuba may indeed be
entitled to compensation and that the naval base in Guantanamo is an
unnecessary, expensive relic of the Cold War.

Perhaps I should have written a different article titled, "What Would
the President Do When General Castro Embarrasses His New Cuba Policy?".

José Azel
Senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at
the University of Miami. Azel was a political exile from Cuba at the age
of 13 in 1961 and is the author of Mañana in Cuba. Follow @JoseAzel.

Source: On Cuba, I Told You So -
http://panampost.com/jose-azel/2015/03/05/on-cuba-i-told-you-so/