What would Cuba do?

What would Cuba do?
[02-03-2015 12:46:08]
José Azel
Investigador, Universidad de Miami

(www.miscelaneasdecuba.net).- Editor's note: José Azel presented his
original testimony, "What Would Cuba Do?" to the US House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on February 26. Watch the full video of the hearing at
the bottom of this article, with Azel at 27:58.
Mr. chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee, I
am honored to have this opportunity to share my analysis on the US
national security implications of the administration's new Cuba policy,
and I commend you on calling this hearing on what is often a
misunderstood threat to our national interests.

Last year, when the New York Times editorial board and others
intensified their campaign for a unilateral-unconditional change in
US-Cuba policy, I published an essay titled: WWCD; that is, What Would
Castro Do if the United States were to unilaterally and unconditionally
end economic sanctions?

I argued then that not probing how Castro would respond was an
irresponsible omission, since the formulation of US foreign policy is
often compared to a chess game in which every prospective move is
analyzed with an eye to what the adversary's counter move would be. A
foreign policy move always seeks reciprocity.

General Raul Castro has now provided a comprehensive answer to my "What
Would Castro Do" question.

On January 28, 2015, speaking in Costa Rica and addressing the III
Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC),
General Castro set his demands. Before the two nations can re-establish
normal relations the United States must:

Unconditionally eliminate all economic sanctions.
Return to Cuba the Guantanamo US naval base.
Stop all the transmissions of Radio-TV Martí.
Compensate Cuba for the supposed damages caused by the embargo — which
Cuba estimates at US$116 billion and growing.
Eliminate Cuba from the US "State Sponsors of Terrorism" list.

The general declared that "If these problems aren't resolved, this
diplomatic rapprochement wouldn't make any sense." And that "It would
not be ethical or acceptable to ask Cuba for anything in return… Cuba
will not negotiate on these internal matters which are absolutely
sovereign."
With the general's impossible preconditions now known, advocates of
unconditional concessions to the Castro regime will likely double down
and begin spinning all sorts of dangerous arguments as to why we should
stay the new course.

We will hear that: General Castro was just laying out a starting
negotiating position or that, since we tried economic sanctions for so
long, should we not give this new policy some time?
And more troubling, we may even begin to hear arguments that Cuba may
indeed be entitled to compensation from US taxpayers, or that the naval
base in Guantanamo is an unnecessary and expensive relic of the Cold War.

Distinguished members, when you hear these arguments, just consider for
a moment how Mr. Putin and the Russian navy would love to have a
warm-water port in the Caribbean of the quality of our Guantanamo naval
base.

Consider also that if we further remove travel restrictions, thousands
of small private vessels from South Florida will begin visiting Cuba on
a regular basis and may return with hidden cargo. We can all use our
imagination as to the nature of the cargo, whether drugs, contraband
goods, or human trafficking. Our overstretched Coast Guard would not be
able to effectively monitor thousands of private vessels traveling
regularly between South Florida and Cuba.

Given the long-standing and close links between Cuba and Iran, this
ocean travel possibility exposes our border security to new and serious
vulnerabilities to terrorism and contraband.

Moreover, the president's new measures will enrich primarily the Cuban
military, and will not impede General Castro's close alliance with Iran,
Russia, or Venezuela. It is hard to discern how fortifying a
totalitarian government promotes democracy.

The new Cuba policy has legitimized the Cuban military regime in the
eyes of the world. By sanctioning an oppressive regime that violates
human rights with abandon, the president has reversed our long standing
support for democratic governance in Latin America.

Since the 1970s, US policy toward Latin America has emphasized
democracy, human rights, and constitutional government. Arguably, US
policy in defense of democratic governance has not been uniform
throughout the world. But until recently, defending democratic values
was our long-established policy in Latin America. The gratuitous
normalization of relations with an oppressive military dictatorship
sends the wrong message to the continent.

Every Latin-American would-be dictator now realizes that suppressing
civil liberties in his country is not an impediment to having a good
diplomatic and commercial relationship with the United States.
Contrary to the argument of some that the new policy will help improve
relations with Latin America, our implicit seal of approval of a
military dictatorship further weakens US influence and prestige in the
region. It encourages anti-US leaders everywhere to take positions
inimical to US interests, as Cuba has done for decades. One unfortunate
visual the new policy has conveyed is that taking US hostages can be
very rewarding.

Finally, General Castro, in order to secure whatever advantages he may
be pursuing, may promise some minor concessions. But before embracing
his military dictatorship, we should understand the general has made it
clear that Cuba will not change its ways.

Source: What would Cuba do? - Misceláneas de Cuba -
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